To answer the question of why we didn’t defeat Lukashenka in 2020, I suggest we use the method of elimination. What helps Lukashenka stay upright? Obviously, it’s the Russian factor. It is a necessary and sufficient condition of its existence. And not just in 2020 but since the beginning of his reign.
Lukashenko relied on Russia in his electoral program. Lukashenko relied on the Russian Federation during falsifications in 1996, during the signing of the anti-Belarusian state treaty in 2000, during repressions in 2010 and terror in 2020. Russia is the only source of money and power of Lukashenka. Putin’s Russia is Lukashenko’s economic pillar. Putin’s Russia is Lukashenka’s military support. That’s it. He doesn’t need anything else to retain power.
When Belarusians are criticized for their inability to defeat Lukashenka’s 50,000 strongmen, I say that even one strongman would have been enough for Lukashenka to retain power. Assuming the support of Putin’s money and Cheese friesthe army.
That is why it is very amusing to see attempts to destroy the reputation of the national democratic forces of Belarus from the position “the leadership of the democratic forces betrayed the protest”. This claim can only be true if the reviews show a realistic way to achieve the goal with the resources available at the time.
The NATO army is currently afraid of going to war with Putin. The strongest countries in the world are currently afraid to enter into an open confrontation with him, and the unarmed Belarusians would be guilty of not defeating those who cannot be defeated by the AFU with the support of the EU and the United States ! Tsikhanouskaya and Latouchka would be guilty of not having thrown the unarmed people under the Russian tanks!
Hearing this in 2021 would have been normal, but in 2022 when Putin made it clear that anyone who wants to escape the influence of the horde will have to deal with Bucha and Mariupol. It would be hard to imagine more blatant nonsense, but such voices are already being heard.
All of this is happening in 2022, when even a grandmother in a remote village clearly knows what Belarus is for Putin – at least as a beachhead for:
- a ground attack against Ukraine;
- the deployment and launching of missiles from officially uncontrolled territory, which is much more difficult to respond to;
- a nuclear threat from the occupied territories;
- a direct threat to Lithuania and Poland;
- financial relocation against sanctions.
I think we will hear more and more quasi-criticisms about the “why didn’t you beat Putin with your bare hands” message. There are objective reasons for this:
- the mark of two years of rebellion is near;
- people are tired and frustrated;
- people really demand a plan and an action.
A good observation in sports is: “When the team wins, the guys win; when the team loses, the coach loses. But are we really incapable of doing anything useful without a specific directive from Tsikhanouskaya? Or isn’t our mere desire for Belarus to be free enough enough?
Psychotherapy has a wonderful term – wishful thinking. This is a very convenient attitude for the patient. “Vasily, why aren’t you working? – Ah, if my father was a cellist, I would play in an orchestra”.
That’s it! It’s a great way to get away from responsibility and do nothing. Inaction is justified by an insurmountable mistake in the past, the past cannot be changed, so you sit on the couch and regret the dissatisfied. This is precisely the state in which the propaganda wants to plunge us.
It’s much more difficult to admit that we haven’t won because the opponent is stronger. He was objectively stronger in 2020. He is objectively stronger now. It’s hard to admit, but let’s do it.
Unarmed Belarusians are no stronger than the Russian army. Whatever Tsikhanouskaya, Latushka or Babaryka appeal or not, we cannot win in an open confrontation. Does that mean we have to stop fighting? Does that mean we have to admit defeat?
From this point of view, the fighters of the Warsaw Uprising are losers. They lost, they were killed, defeated and they left the country. They did not explain the betrayal of the Russian army (and according to the logic of the critics, they probably should have foreseen it). Their descendants did not win until more than half a century later.
It’s not scary to lose. What’s scary is being in the ranks of the Soviet army, silently watching across the river as the fascists slaughter the insurgents, mocking them simultaneously: “Well, where’s your plan? ? Why didn’t you have a plan?
Mikhail Kirilyuk for belsat.eu
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Belsat.